Can a Plausible Case be Made for Participatory Democracy under Modern Conditions?
The most common use of the term “democracy” today usually connotes a general concept of popular rule as opposed to other less attractive alternatives like tyranny or plutocracy. It is not a term that one often hears accompanying a limiting adjective whether in political or every day use. There are however important distinctions to be made within the concept of democracy that have enormous meaning for how one conceives system he is speaking of. One such distinction is that of participatory democracy and representative democracy. For the purposes of this essay I will refer to “participatory” democracy as the system in which “substantial numbers of private citizens (as distinct from public officials or elected politicians) play a part in the processes by which political leaders are chosen” and “government policies are shaped and implemented.” (Birch 104)
This essay will compare the so called Classical theory of Democracy with a more contemporary definition as most explicitly outlined by Joseph Schumpeter. It will then examine relatively recent arguments defending the classical or participatory theory’s viability for use today. It will conclude that though there may be some lessons to be learned from the participatory theory, its alternative, representative theory is ultimately better suited to implementation under modern conditions.
“Democracy, as it was classically understood meant above all direct citizen participation; either democracy was participatory, or it was a sham.” (Dahl 226) Jean- Jacques Rousseau, writing in the 18th century composed what can be considered the ultimate construction of participatory democratic government. His theory emphasized tremendously the necessity for political equality among all citizens of a democracy. The centerpiece of his system is the participation of each equal citizen in all of the affairs of the government. A citizen’s interaction with the government includes having some say in each decision the body politic makes. Participation is so complete that it creates “a society in which the affairs of the state are integrated into the affairs of ordinary citizens.” (Held 57) The citizens in this arrangement both create and are bound by the manifestation of the public will that is achieved. This creates a hypothetical situation in which all are both independent and equally dependent on the government.
This arrangement, Rousseau argued, yields several benefits. Every man is equally involved in making the decisions of the group. In this way it serves to protect the private interests of each because “the only policy that will be acceptable is the one in which the benefits and burdens are equally shared.” (Pateman 23) Further, because each man will consider every decision (even those that do not immediately affect him) in terms of himself, liberty for all will be secured. This point is closely related to another point crucial for defendants of the classical theory: participation in an equal political situation reaps great educational and psychological benefits for the society. Consistently taking part in the right kinds of both private and public decision making activity teaches one to be the right kind private and public citizen. The practice of considering the effects of policies on the whole of society helps citizens to empathize with one another. This sort of empathy would eventually help to blur the line between the public and private will which in turn creates a stabilizing, and most importantly self-sustaining arrangement. The harmonious duality of control and contribution experienced by members of Rousseau’s society makes their obedience more likely and their freedom more personal. “The human results that accrue through the participatory process provide an important justification for a participatory system.” (Pateman 25)
Of course this theory of democracy has been criticized as unrealistic in application. All modern states seem far too large to conceivably offer the kind of participation that Rousseau’s system would require. Even one of the most frequently offered illustrations of such a government, ancient Athens, falls far short of realizing the political equality advocated in theory. “The classical polis was marked by unity, solidarity, participation and a highly restricted citizenship. The state reached deeply into the lives of its citizens, but embraced only a small portion of the population.” (Held 23) A population of nearly two hundred thousand was governed by a quorum of only sixty thousand men, those above the age of twenty. Surely cutting down populations even of Athens’ modest size is a necessary requirement for any sort of meeting of reasonable length and constructive debate.
This criticism leads intuitively to the solution of representative government.
Schumpeter defines what I will here call representative democracy as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” (174) This interpretation looks something like the definition of classical democracy stated above with one blaring omission: any role of private citizens in the actual decision making process. Citizens of a representative democracy never actually consider for themselves the various alternatives for handling any public issue but instead choose among alternatives offered by politicians struggle for their votes. Once a government is supplied by a majority vote of the citizens “the reins of government should be handed over to those who command more support than do any of the competing individuals or teams.” (Schumpeter 177) Representative democracy theorists offer a manageable solution for establishing a working government in areas of enormous populations, but their criticisms of traditional participatory democracy are not limited to its impracticality. The classical theory rests on assumptions of “individual selfishness, in the sense that each person would be motivated by the desire to protect or enhance his own personal interests, and individual rationality in the sense that each person could be expected to make rational calculation of probable gains and losses before acting.” (Birch 112) Critics challenge both.
A central argument of representative theorist is that a coherent “public will” working toward a “common good” is dangerously misleading, and that neither concept withstands scrutiny. “To different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things.” (Schumpeter 155) Even in the event that a common good was determined there would be no consensus on the best way it could be secured. The idea that a participatory democracy would achieve, even in the long run, some sort of balance is groundless. Instead, Schumpeter argues, we can see the masses as an “infinitely complex jumble of individual and group-wise situations.” (156) Because few people have firm convictions or a wealth of knowledge concerning issues that in no way involve them, as many government decisions will not, they will become prey to the propaganda of strongly motivated interest groups.
Additionally, the participatory democratic system offers little motivation for an individual to carefully consider, or even rationally decide issues. “He is a member of an unworkable committee, the committee of a whole nation, and this is why he expends less disciplined effort on mastering a political problem than he expends on a game of bridge.” (Schumpeter 165) With the reduced sense of reality inherent in playing a small part in abstract government affairs so far removed from our immediate private concerns comes a reduced sense of responsibility and a complete lack of effective volition. Considering the possibility that one individual’s vote will make a decisive difference is extremely miniscule, it might even be a rational calculation to not bother expending the tiny effort necessary to get to the polling booth. Even if one is motivated to vote by a desire for satisfaction in fulfilling a political obligation it undermines the value of the rational, benefit maximizing approach to the act. “These are psychological or emotional satisfactions, not calculated prospects of personal gain.” (Birch 113) For all these reasons human beings are likely to be easily swayed by small political interest groups with some agenda other than the “public good.” As such the “political will” will not be an authentic product of democracy, but a creation of those “with an axe to grind.” (Schumpeter 167)
Representative democracy solves these problems by creating accountable leadership that acts as a trustee of the electors. Such a system “is important since public views can be ‘refined and enlarged’ when passed through the medium of a chosen body of citizens … and the elected few, able to withstand the political process, are likely to be competent and capable of discerning the true interest of their country.” (Held 92) Having access to the big picture, leaders are far more capable of taking an objective view and synthesizing the concerns of the population into a coherent strategy with which to act towards a common interest. Leaders are also capable of averting political deadlocks far more easily that complete participation. “Elected representatives and appointed officials can probably bargain and compromise over issues more easily than citizen groups” (Birch 110) and “in the best instances, the people are presented with results they never thought of and would not have approved in the first place.” (Schumpeter 183)
While the representative theory of democracy seems to be greatly more realistic an option given the size of modern states its acceptance is far from universal. Supporters of modern participation theory point out the vast disparity in political participation between the highest and lowest social and economic levels. The current system would properly be termed a polyarchy, in which different minority groups have control over political decisions. The vast majority of leaders come from the wealthiest, most educated of elites while the lower social classes who have the most to gain from political change seem apathetic. Additionally To simply change our definition of democracy to encompass this situation is problematic. It abandons the important benefits that the populous gains from participation itself. When “the individual is concerned solely with his own private affairs then the ‘self regarding’ virtues suffer, as well as the capacities for responsible public action remain undeveloped.” (Patemen 30) Theorists, some argue, should not be content with allowing large groups to remain completely politically inactive. “Surely we must reject the complacent view that the democratic idea has finally been reached in its highest feasible level of attainment with the institution of polyarchy in the nation state.” (Dahl 231)
One proposed solution lies in the development of democratic authority structures in non-governmental social institutions. Eckstein has argued that “if any aspect of social life can directly affect government it is the experiences with authority that men have in other spheres of life, especially those to which they normally devote most of their lives.” (as quoted in Pateman 12) Carole Pateman applies this argument to economic institutions, and considers the lack of democratic process in industrial arrangements a harmful political trait. Millions who “had formally been given the means to self government had in fact been ‘trained to subservience’ and this training had largely taken place during the course of their daily employment.” (38) Perhaps if democratic situations were more prevalent in people’s daily working situations they would be more likely to participate in similarly democratic government institutions. Pateman argues that representative governments will never be sufficient for Democracy. “Democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes in psychological qualities can be developed.” (42)
However, after wide scale implementation of such theories the political world would look so different than the current situation it would be difficult to call them modern conditions. “Democratic regulation of life [at least in the completely participatory sense] could not be realized under the constraints imposed by the capitalist relations of production.” (Held 129) My objection here to the possibility of democratizing private industry is similar (if not identical) to a particular argument some have advanced against participatory democracy in general. Participatory systems are generally only effective in very small groups, and Rousseau had the small city state in mind. However, when quarrelling or ambition arise surely one small city may take action and dominate another. “Now that it has become larger than all its neighbors and has more resources, its people begin to experience the rewards of empire. So they vanquish a few more tiny neighbors.” (Dahl 229) As the small empire expands, soon it reaches proportions no longer suitable for participatory government. Surely this example is even more apt in terms of economic institutions. It is hard to imagine titanic national or multinational economic institutions like McDonalds being run by absolute democratic participation. There would be few people left to take care of the actual business of salting the fries.
In conclusion, the systems advocated by Rousseau are ill-suited to governments as large and complex as those that exist in the modern world. Those important differences are well summarized by the considerations of Montesquieu as composed by David Held.
The contrast between the ancient and the modern is, according to Montesquieu, one between particular locales, tightly knit communities, a frugal economy, a concern for virtue and civic discipline promoting active citizenship, on the one hand, and large nation-states, centralized bueracratic hierarchies, loosely connected commercial societies, inequality of fortunes and the free pursuit of private interests on the other.” (Held 84)
However, one needn’t abandon political participation completely simple because total participatory democracy in politics or economic social institutions does not seem feasible in the modern world. Greater political participation, even in the more limited way of electing representatives, or contributing to local politics can still reap great educational benefits, and it is correct to encourage those activities throughout our society.
This essay will compare the so called Classical theory of Democracy with a more contemporary definition as most explicitly outlined by Joseph Schumpeter. It will then examine relatively recent arguments defending the classical or participatory theory’s viability for use today. It will conclude that though there may be some lessons to be learned from the participatory theory, its alternative, representative theory is ultimately better suited to implementation under modern conditions.
“Democracy, as it was classically understood meant above all direct citizen participation; either democracy was participatory, or it was a sham.” (Dahl 226) Jean- Jacques Rousseau, writing in the 18th century composed what can be considered the ultimate construction of participatory democratic government. His theory emphasized tremendously the necessity for political equality among all citizens of a democracy. The centerpiece of his system is the participation of each equal citizen in all of the affairs of the government. A citizen’s interaction with the government includes having some say in each decision the body politic makes. Participation is so complete that it creates “a society in which the affairs of the state are integrated into the affairs of ordinary citizens.” (Held 57) The citizens in this arrangement both create and are bound by the manifestation of the public will that is achieved. This creates a hypothetical situation in which all are both independent and equally dependent on the government.
This arrangement, Rousseau argued, yields several benefits. Every man is equally involved in making the decisions of the group. In this way it serves to protect the private interests of each because “the only policy that will be acceptable is the one in which the benefits and burdens are equally shared.” (Pateman 23) Further, because each man will consider every decision (even those that do not immediately affect him) in terms of himself, liberty for all will be secured. This point is closely related to another point crucial for defendants of the classical theory: participation in an equal political situation reaps great educational and psychological benefits for the society. Consistently taking part in the right kinds of both private and public decision making activity teaches one to be the right kind private and public citizen. The practice of considering the effects of policies on the whole of society helps citizens to empathize with one another. This sort of empathy would eventually help to blur the line between the public and private will which in turn creates a stabilizing, and most importantly self-sustaining arrangement. The harmonious duality of control and contribution experienced by members of Rousseau’s society makes their obedience more likely and their freedom more personal. “The human results that accrue through the participatory process provide an important justification for a participatory system.” (Pateman 25)
Of course this theory of democracy has been criticized as unrealistic in application. All modern states seem far too large to conceivably offer the kind of participation that Rousseau’s system would require. Even one of the most frequently offered illustrations of such a government, ancient Athens, falls far short of realizing the political equality advocated in theory. “The classical polis was marked by unity, solidarity, participation and a highly restricted citizenship. The state reached deeply into the lives of its citizens, but embraced only a small portion of the population.” (Held 23) A population of nearly two hundred thousand was governed by a quorum of only sixty thousand men, those above the age of twenty. Surely cutting down populations even of Athens’ modest size is a necessary requirement for any sort of meeting of reasonable length and constructive debate.
This criticism leads intuitively to the solution of representative government.
Schumpeter defines what I will here call representative democracy as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” (174) This interpretation looks something like the definition of classical democracy stated above with one blaring omission: any role of private citizens in the actual decision making process. Citizens of a representative democracy never actually consider for themselves the various alternatives for handling any public issue but instead choose among alternatives offered by politicians struggle for their votes. Once a government is supplied by a majority vote of the citizens “the reins of government should be handed over to those who command more support than do any of the competing individuals or teams.” (Schumpeter 177) Representative democracy theorists offer a manageable solution for establishing a working government in areas of enormous populations, but their criticisms of traditional participatory democracy are not limited to its impracticality. The classical theory rests on assumptions of “individual selfishness, in the sense that each person would be motivated by the desire to protect or enhance his own personal interests, and individual rationality in the sense that each person could be expected to make rational calculation of probable gains and losses before acting.” (Birch 112) Critics challenge both.
A central argument of representative theorist is that a coherent “public will” working toward a “common good” is dangerously misleading, and that neither concept withstands scrutiny. “To different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things.” (Schumpeter 155) Even in the event that a common good was determined there would be no consensus on the best way it could be secured. The idea that a participatory democracy would achieve, even in the long run, some sort of balance is groundless. Instead, Schumpeter argues, we can see the masses as an “infinitely complex jumble of individual and group-wise situations.” (156) Because few people have firm convictions or a wealth of knowledge concerning issues that in no way involve them, as many government decisions will not, they will become prey to the propaganda of strongly motivated interest groups.
Additionally, the participatory democratic system offers little motivation for an individual to carefully consider, or even rationally decide issues. “He is a member of an unworkable committee, the committee of a whole nation, and this is why he expends less disciplined effort on mastering a political problem than he expends on a game of bridge.” (Schumpeter 165) With the reduced sense of reality inherent in playing a small part in abstract government affairs so far removed from our immediate private concerns comes a reduced sense of responsibility and a complete lack of effective volition. Considering the possibility that one individual’s vote will make a decisive difference is extremely miniscule, it might even be a rational calculation to not bother expending the tiny effort necessary to get to the polling booth. Even if one is motivated to vote by a desire for satisfaction in fulfilling a political obligation it undermines the value of the rational, benefit maximizing approach to the act. “These are psychological or emotional satisfactions, not calculated prospects of personal gain.” (Birch 113) For all these reasons human beings are likely to be easily swayed by small political interest groups with some agenda other than the “public good.” As such the “political will” will not be an authentic product of democracy, but a creation of those “with an axe to grind.” (Schumpeter 167)
Representative democracy solves these problems by creating accountable leadership that acts as a trustee of the electors. Such a system “is important since public views can be ‘refined and enlarged’ when passed through the medium of a chosen body of citizens … and the elected few, able to withstand the political process, are likely to be competent and capable of discerning the true interest of their country.” (Held 92) Having access to the big picture, leaders are far more capable of taking an objective view and synthesizing the concerns of the population into a coherent strategy with which to act towards a common interest. Leaders are also capable of averting political deadlocks far more easily that complete participation. “Elected representatives and appointed officials can probably bargain and compromise over issues more easily than citizen groups” (Birch 110) and “in the best instances, the people are presented with results they never thought of and would not have approved in the first place.” (Schumpeter 183)
While the representative theory of democracy seems to be greatly more realistic an option given the size of modern states its acceptance is far from universal. Supporters of modern participation theory point out the vast disparity in political participation between the highest and lowest social and economic levels. The current system would properly be termed a polyarchy, in which different minority groups have control over political decisions. The vast majority of leaders come from the wealthiest, most educated of elites while the lower social classes who have the most to gain from political change seem apathetic. Additionally To simply change our definition of democracy to encompass this situation is problematic. It abandons the important benefits that the populous gains from participation itself. When “the individual is concerned solely with his own private affairs then the ‘self regarding’ virtues suffer, as well as the capacities for responsible public action remain undeveloped.” (Patemen 30) Theorists, some argue, should not be content with allowing large groups to remain completely politically inactive. “Surely we must reject the complacent view that the democratic idea has finally been reached in its highest feasible level of attainment with the institution of polyarchy in the nation state.” (Dahl 231)
One proposed solution lies in the development of democratic authority structures in non-governmental social institutions. Eckstein has argued that “if any aspect of social life can directly affect government it is the experiences with authority that men have in other spheres of life, especially those to which they normally devote most of their lives.” (as quoted in Pateman 12) Carole Pateman applies this argument to economic institutions, and considers the lack of democratic process in industrial arrangements a harmful political trait. Millions who “had formally been given the means to self government had in fact been ‘trained to subservience’ and this training had largely taken place during the course of their daily employment.” (38) Perhaps if democratic situations were more prevalent in people’s daily working situations they would be more likely to participate in similarly democratic government institutions. Pateman argues that representative governments will never be sufficient for Democracy. “Democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes in psychological qualities can be developed.” (42)
However, after wide scale implementation of such theories the political world would look so different than the current situation it would be difficult to call them modern conditions. “Democratic regulation of life [at least in the completely participatory sense] could not be realized under the constraints imposed by the capitalist relations of production.” (Held 129) My objection here to the possibility of democratizing private industry is similar (if not identical) to a particular argument some have advanced against participatory democracy in general. Participatory systems are generally only effective in very small groups, and Rousseau had the small city state in mind. However, when quarrelling or ambition arise surely one small city may take action and dominate another. “Now that it has become larger than all its neighbors and has more resources, its people begin to experience the rewards of empire. So they vanquish a few more tiny neighbors.” (Dahl 229) As the small empire expands, soon it reaches proportions no longer suitable for participatory government. Surely this example is even more apt in terms of economic institutions. It is hard to imagine titanic national or multinational economic institutions like McDonalds being run by absolute democratic participation. There would be few people left to take care of the actual business of salting the fries.
In conclusion, the systems advocated by Rousseau are ill-suited to governments as large and complex as those that exist in the modern world. Those important differences are well summarized by the considerations of Montesquieu as composed by David Held.
The contrast between the ancient and the modern is, according to Montesquieu, one between particular locales, tightly knit communities, a frugal economy, a concern for virtue and civic discipline promoting active citizenship, on the one hand, and large nation-states, centralized bueracratic hierarchies, loosely connected commercial societies, inequality of fortunes and the free pursuit of private interests on the other.” (Held 84)
However, one needn’t abandon political participation completely simple because total participatory democracy in politics or economic social institutions does not seem feasible in the modern world. Greater political participation, even in the more limited way of electing representatives, or contributing to local politics can still reap great educational benefits, and it is correct to encourage those activities throughout our society.
posted by John Powell at 4:00 PM
