The Duck-Bunny and "Seeing As"
In Section 11 of part 2 of the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein begins a discussion of the different aspects one is able to notice in certain picture-objects. The phenomenon being explored here is the peculiar ability to see the very same illustration in multiple different ways. Indeed we are able to look at certain picture objects and see them “now as one thing, now as another.” (PI p165) In order to illustrate this point Wittgenstein uses a number of greatly varying examples. Perhaps the most prominent of these is the duck-rabbit, a drawing which can be seen both as the head of a duck facing to the left as well as a rabbit facing to the right.
An examination of this drawing presents us with a number of perplexing observations, part of the paradox of what Wittgenstein will call aspect-dawning. Let us imagine that one looks at the picture of the duck-rabbit, and at first only sees it as a drawing of a rabbit. It would be completely possible for me to look at the drawing hundreds of times without ever noticing any aspect of the drawing other than its representation of a rabbit. Wittgenstein would call this experience of the duck-rabbit ‘continuous seeing’ of the aspect of the rabbit in the drawing. But let us imagine that on the 201st time I took out the illustration of the duck-rabbit to examine it (perhaps while sitting on a bench in a park) a small duck approaches and crosses – from right to left – in front of my bench. After briefly looking up at the passing duck, I look back to the duck-rabbit illustration and notice something that I had never noticed before: I am able to see the illustration in a completely new way. Suddenly the illustration has changed, and I am able to see it as a duck – and not only can I see a duck where I once saw a rabbit, but I am also able to switch back and forth between seeing the two aspects of the drawing at will.
How are we supposed to explain this sudden change in a once familiar picture? To state one of the key questions Wittgenstein will examine in this section: “does it follow from this that I see something different in the two cases?” (PI 167) Certainly this is the expression that we might expect one to use in this situation – “I saw it quite differently!” With what accuracy can we say that the picture is now all together different? The object of our visual perception has remained exactly the same, yet in some way we feel compelled to say that our perception has changed. If someone asked us about the aspect-dawning we might describe our changing experience in much the same way we would if the object of visual perception (the drawing) had in fact moved about on the page to create a new impression. It would be understood to say “the object altered before my eyes.” (PI 167)
This way of putting it, it seems, however, is capable of leading us into dangerous territory. When we use the word “see” here the way it is usually used is likely to lead us to a distinctly un-Wittgensteinian picture of what occurred. Obviously the description mentioned above would not lead one to understand that the physical ink of the illustration altered somehow on the page, but rather to the understanding that what changed here was our “visual impression” of the drawing has changed. This implies that some sort of internal change took place – not in the drawing itself, but in the drawing perceived by our mind’s eye. Here we are already entangled in nonsense.
“And above all do not say ‘after all my visual impression isn’t the drawing; it is this – which I can’t shew to anyone.” – Of course it is not the drawing, but neither is it anything of the same category, which I carry within myself.” (PI 167) If we say that some thing has changed here we are necessarily saying it is some internal thing. This is bound to lead us to misunderstandings. The mind does not have eyes, and they are not looking at strange chimerical internally morphing objects. Visual perception is something done with our eyes not our brains. The idea of an internal picture is a bad analogy because it suggests that the eye (with which we see) operates in the same way as the mind (which is involved in seeing as). Let us examine several examples that suggest that this is not the case.
First, understanding the dawning of aspects as suggested above implies that there is some visually perceivable “organization,” which is on level with colors and shapes, that the mind is able to perceive in a different way in order to see the illustration as something else. (PI 167-68) This is problematic. Colors and shapes, the objects of visual perception, tend to be mutually exclusive. If a particular square is red then it is not green, and it is generally not possible to see a square sometimes as one color and sometimes another. Additionally, a square will not sometimes appear to be a triangle. The aspects of the duck-rabbit, on the other hand, are pluralistic. Our initial perplexity arose in the fact that sometimes the same picture appeared as a rabbit, other times a duck.
Secondly, the analogy with seeing an image and experiencing a aspect-dawning falls flat when we consider our ability to intentionally try to see either the duck or the rabbit. We can both attempt to see a picture as something else, as well as encourage others to do so, and often we will succeed. This does not make sense applied to purely visual perceptions. “Seeing an aspect and imagining are subject to the will. There is such an order as ‘Imagine this’, and also: ‘Now see the figure like this’; but not: ‘Now see this leaf green’.” (PI 182) These objections are not to say, of course, that seeing has nothing to do with seeing-as, however they are related in a different way than the internal picture conception would have us understand.
When suddenly, and all at once, the Duck appears from what had always looked to be a rabbit before, one is likely moved to exclaim “There it is! A Bunny!” This exclamation does not result, on the other hand, from seeing the aspect that had always appeared to one before. (The distinction is between continuous aspect seeing and aspect dawning.) These two ways of experiencing aspects are different in that one produces a report that is forced from us. Wittgenstein suggests that this exclamation is related to the experience as a cry is to pain. “If you are looking at the object, you need not think of it; but if you are having the visual experience expressed by the exclamation, you are also thinking of what you see … Hence the flashing of an aspect on us seems half visual experience, half thought.” (PI 168)
Let us briefly now turn to examine the relationship between visual experience and thought in Wittgenstein’s understanding. In this conception what has changed when the rabbit suddenly becomes a duck is not some internal object, but simply our interpretation of an image. “Interpretation” here refers to the thought-part of aspect seeing, and I will now attempt to contrast several examples that will help to determine how this word might best be understood here.
The concept is closely related to the idea of one’s representation of an aspect that one sees. How one is likely to represent any particular aspect-seeing is helpful in understanding the relationship between thought and seeing that we are interested in. Indeed seeing-as is sometimes more a process of thought and other times more a process of seeing. Examples will serve to clarify. Some instances of seeing aspects are largely optically based. A telling example here is that of the double cross. “You only ‘see the duck and Rabbit aspects’ if you are already conversant with the shapes of those two animals. There is no analogous condition for seeing the aspects [of the double cross]” (PI 177) In this case one might represent which aspect of the figure on which he was focusing simply by pointing to the white or black segments of the picture.
On the other hand, aspect-dawning in the case of the duck-rabbit, for instance, is rather concept (as opposed to visually) intensive in the sense that in order to convey the experience of seeing a duck instead of a bunny to another individual one must generally appeal to the shared concept of what ducks are, what they look like, and how they are often represented two dimensionally etc. Another concept intensive examples of seeing-as are the experience of shades of meaning on the drawing or painting of a face. (PI 169)
Yet another and perhaps more illustrative example regards the aspects of a basic triangle. Wittgenstein cleverly conceives of all sorts of ways we might look at a triangle: “as a triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawing; as standing on its base, as hanging from its apex; as a mountain, as a wedge, as an arrow or pointer, as an overturned object…” (PI 171)
This last example helps nicely to illustrate two points. First, that the only rules that determine how one might be able to interpret images into new aspects are those that are set by our language games. There is no set of general descriptions for any particular illustration. “Here we are in enormous danger of wanting to make fine distinctions. – It is the same when one tries to define the concept of a material object in terms of ‘what is really seen.’ – What we have rather to do is accept the everyday language-game, and to note false accounts of the matter as false.” (PI 171) This means that much like in Wittgenstein’s description of words and their meanings, the various aspects an image can be seen-as will be determined by its use. I cannot argue that one way of seeing a drawing of a triangle is a palm tree. This relationship simply does not exist in our society. On the other hand, the claim that the same triangle can be seen-as an arrow pointing slightly down and to the right is valid if it is conceivable that we might experience it that way in our society – this aspect of the image needs no further justification. (PI 176)
A second important point illustrated by the triangle example is that of the necessity of certain substratum concepts in order to be able to interpret a picture in different ways. “In the triangle I can see now this as apex, that as base – now this as apex, that as base. – Clearly the words “Now I am seeing this as the apex” cannot so far mean anything to a learner who has only just met the concepts of apex, base and so on.” (PI 178) It follows then that in order to have a particular experience one must sometimes have a mastery of some particular concept, which indeed seems odd, though is evidenced by the different experiences available to a pianist at the sounding of a minor chord (a structural familiarity as well as an emotional effect.)
We have made a case for the importance of thought (through the importance of concepts and interpretations) for aspect dawning. However, this is not to discount the importance of the physical capability of sight for seeing-as. We can imagine someone who is unable to see aspects the way people normally do, though they could receive the knowledge of what pictures are supposed to reflect. Wittgenstein dubs this condition aspect-blindness and compares it to color blindness. An aspect blind person, then, would be able to identify the picture of the duck-rabbit, and would know that the picture was capable of symbolizing both a duck and a rabbit, but he could not see them, or perhaps could only see one or the other. Additionally, he might see a representation of a 3 dimensional cube, and know it to be a diagram of such, but be unable to see the aspects of the image change. (PI 182)
Wittgenstein uses this idea to explore the connection between seeing aspects and “experiencing the meaning of a word.” (PI 182) In the same way that the aspect-blind person could know what he was supposed to do with the diagram of a cube, he would never experience the meaning of the diagram, or be able to interpret it in different ways (see it differently), but rather he would always see it two dimensionally, as conglomeration of hexagons. This would be similar to an individual who was trapped in only ever understanding the meaning of words as they exist in the Augustinian picture of language. Just as the aspect blind individual could only see the diagram of the cube as a dead sign representing its counterpart in reality, unable to see the rich texture of associations that make it possible for individuals to see different aspects, so too would the person stuck in the Augustinian picture of language be able to get a feel for the meaning of words, and the subtle webs of connections between them that make them that allow us to use them as we do. The life of an aspect blind person would be depressing indeed. Where a aspect sighted person could enjoy the multiplex of different uses human beings have for a painting, the aspect blind person would see only a blue print, or a diagram, and as Wittgenstein notes on page 175, though texts are sometimes hung on the walls with paintings, theorems of mechanics don’t supply the same allure.
An examination of this drawing presents us with a number of perplexing observations, part of the paradox of what Wittgenstein will call aspect-dawning. Let us imagine that one looks at the picture of the duck-rabbit, and at first only sees it as a drawing of a rabbit. It would be completely possible for me to look at the drawing hundreds of times without ever noticing any aspect of the drawing other than its representation of a rabbit. Wittgenstein would call this experience of the duck-rabbit ‘continuous seeing’ of the aspect of the rabbit in the drawing. But let us imagine that on the 201st time I took out the illustration of the duck-rabbit to examine it (perhaps while sitting on a bench in a park) a small duck approaches and crosses – from right to left – in front of my bench. After briefly looking up at the passing duck, I look back to the duck-rabbit illustration and notice something that I had never noticed before: I am able to see the illustration in a completely new way. Suddenly the illustration has changed, and I am able to see it as a duck – and not only can I see a duck where I once saw a rabbit, but I am also able to switch back and forth between seeing the two aspects of the drawing at will.
How are we supposed to explain this sudden change in a once familiar picture? To state one of the key questions Wittgenstein will examine in this section: “does it follow from this that I see something different in the two cases?” (PI 167) Certainly this is the expression that we might expect one to use in this situation – “I saw it quite differently!” With what accuracy can we say that the picture is now all together different? The object of our visual perception has remained exactly the same, yet in some way we feel compelled to say that our perception has changed. If someone asked us about the aspect-dawning we might describe our changing experience in much the same way we would if the object of visual perception (the drawing) had in fact moved about on the page to create a new impression. It would be understood to say “the object altered before my eyes.” (PI 167)
This way of putting it, it seems, however, is capable of leading us into dangerous territory. When we use the word “see” here the way it is usually used is likely to lead us to a distinctly un-Wittgensteinian picture of what occurred. Obviously the description mentioned above would not lead one to understand that the physical ink of the illustration altered somehow on the page, but rather to the understanding that what changed here was our “visual impression” of the drawing has changed. This implies that some sort of internal change took place – not in the drawing itself, but in the drawing perceived by our mind’s eye. Here we are already entangled in nonsense.
“And above all do not say ‘after all my visual impression isn’t the drawing; it is this – which I can’t shew to anyone.” – Of course it is not the drawing, but neither is it anything of the same category, which I carry within myself.” (PI 167) If we say that some thing has changed here we are necessarily saying it is some internal thing. This is bound to lead us to misunderstandings. The mind does not have eyes, and they are not looking at strange chimerical internally morphing objects. Visual perception is something done with our eyes not our brains. The idea of an internal picture is a bad analogy because it suggests that the eye (with which we see) operates in the same way as the mind (which is involved in seeing as). Let us examine several examples that suggest that this is not the case.
First, understanding the dawning of aspects as suggested above implies that there is some visually perceivable “organization,” which is on level with colors and shapes, that the mind is able to perceive in a different way in order to see the illustration as something else. (PI 167-68) This is problematic. Colors and shapes, the objects of visual perception, tend to be mutually exclusive. If a particular square is red then it is not green, and it is generally not possible to see a square sometimes as one color and sometimes another. Additionally, a square will not sometimes appear to be a triangle. The aspects of the duck-rabbit, on the other hand, are pluralistic. Our initial perplexity arose in the fact that sometimes the same picture appeared as a rabbit, other times a duck.
Secondly, the analogy with seeing an image and experiencing a aspect-dawning falls flat when we consider our ability to intentionally try to see either the duck or the rabbit. We can both attempt to see a picture as something else, as well as encourage others to do so, and often we will succeed. This does not make sense applied to purely visual perceptions. “Seeing an aspect and imagining are subject to the will. There is such an order as ‘Imagine this’, and also: ‘Now see the figure like this’; but not: ‘Now see this leaf green’.” (PI 182) These objections are not to say, of course, that seeing has nothing to do with seeing-as, however they are related in a different way than the internal picture conception would have us understand.
When suddenly, and all at once, the Duck appears from what had always looked to be a rabbit before, one is likely moved to exclaim “There it is! A Bunny!” This exclamation does not result, on the other hand, from seeing the aspect that had always appeared to one before. (The distinction is between continuous aspect seeing and aspect dawning.) These two ways of experiencing aspects are different in that one produces a report that is forced from us. Wittgenstein suggests that this exclamation is related to the experience as a cry is to pain. “If you are looking at the object, you need not think of it; but if you are having the visual experience expressed by the exclamation, you are also thinking of what you see … Hence the flashing of an aspect on us seems half visual experience, half thought.” (PI 168)
Let us briefly now turn to examine the relationship between visual experience and thought in Wittgenstein’s understanding. In this conception what has changed when the rabbit suddenly becomes a duck is not some internal object, but simply our interpretation of an image. “Interpretation” here refers to the thought-part of aspect seeing, and I will now attempt to contrast several examples that will help to determine how this word might best be understood here.
The concept is closely related to the idea of one’s representation of an aspect that one sees. How one is likely to represent any particular aspect-seeing is helpful in understanding the relationship between thought and seeing that we are interested in. Indeed seeing-as is sometimes more a process of thought and other times more a process of seeing. Examples will serve to clarify. Some instances of seeing aspects are largely optically based. A telling example here is that of the double cross. “You only ‘see the duck and Rabbit aspects’ if you are already conversant with the shapes of those two animals. There is no analogous condition for seeing the aspects [of the double cross]” (PI 177) In this case one might represent which aspect of the figure on which he was focusing simply by pointing to the white or black segments of the picture.
On the other hand, aspect-dawning in the case of the duck-rabbit, for instance, is rather concept (as opposed to visually) intensive in the sense that in order to convey the experience of seeing a duck instead of a bunny to another individual one must generally appeal to the shared concept of what ducks are, what they look like, and how they are often represented two dimensionally etc. Another concept intensive examples of seeing-as are the experience of shades of meaning on the drawing or painting of a face. (PI 169)
Yet another and perhaps more illustrative example regards the aspects of a basic triangle. Wittgenstein cleverly conceives of all sorts of ways we might look at a triangle: “as a triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawing; as standing on its base, as hanging from its apex; as a mountain, as a wedge, as an arrow or pointer, as an overturned object…” (PI 171)
This last example helps nicely to illustrate two points. First, that the only rules that determine how one might be able to interpret images into new aspects are those that are set by our language games. There is no set of general descriptions for any particular illustration. “Here we are in enormous danger of wanting to make fine distinctions. – It is the same when one tries to define the concept of a material object in terms of ‘what is really seen.’ – What we have rather to do is accept the everyday language-game, and to note false accounts of the matter as false.” (PI 171) This means that much like in Wittgenstein’s description of words and their meanings, the various aspects an image can be seen-as will be determined by its use. I cannot argue that one way of seeing a drawing of a triangle is a palm tree. This relationship simply does not exist in our society. On the other hand, the claim that the same triangle can be seen-as an arrow pointing slightly down and to the right is valid if it is conceivable that we might experience it that way in our society – this aspect of the image needs no further justification. (PI 176)
A second important point illustrated by the triangle example is that of the necessity of certain substratum concepts in order to be able to interpret a picture in different ways. “In the triangle I can see now this as apex, that as base – now this as apex, that as base. – Clearly the words “Now I am seeing this as the apex” cannot so far mean anything to a learner who has only just met the concepts of apex, base and so on.” (PI 178) It follows then that in order to have a particular experience one must sometimes have a mastery of some particular concept, which indeed seems odd, though is evidenced by the different experiences available to a pianist at the sounding of a minor chord (a structural familiarity as well as an emotional effect.)
We have made a case for the importance of thought (through the importance of concepts and interpretations) for aspect dawning. However, this is not to discount the importance of the physical capability of sight for seeing-as. We can imagine someone who is unable to see aspects the way people normally do, though they could receive the knowledge of what pictures are supposed to reflect. Wittgenstein dubs this condition aspect-blindness and compares it to color blindness. An aspect blind person, then, would be able to identify the picture of the duck-rabbit, and would know that the picture was capable of symbolizing both a duck and a rabbit, but he could not see them, or perhaps could only see one or the other. Additionally, he might see a representation of a 3 dimensional cube, and know it to be a diagram of such, but be unable to see the aspects of the image change. (PI 182)
Wittgenstein uses this idea to explore the connection between seeing aspects and “experiencing the meaning of a word.” (PI 182) In the same way that the aspect-blind person could know what he was supposed to do with the diagram of a cube, he would never experience the meaning of the diagram, or be able to interpret it in different ways (see it differently), but rather he would always see it two dimensionally, as conglomeration of hexagons. This would be similar to an individual who was trapped in only ever understanding the meaning of words as they exist in the Augustinian picture of language. Just as the aspect blind individual could only see the diagram of the cube as a dead sign representing its counterpart in reality, unable to see the rich texture of associations that make it possible for individuals to see different aspects, so too would the person stuck in the Augustinian picture of language be able to get a feel for the meaning of words, and the subtle webs of connections between them that make them that allow us to use them as we do. The life of an aspect blind person would be depressing indeed. Where a aspect sighted person could enjoy the multiplex of different uses human beings have for a painting, the aspect blind person would see only a blue print, or a diagram, and as Wittgenstein notes on page 175, though texts are sometimes hung on the walls with paintings, theorems of mechanics don’t supply the same allure.
posted by John Powell at 10:00 PM
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